| The booming of
artillery awakened Captain Joseph R. Darrigo. Soon shell
fragments and small arms fire were striking his house on the
northeast edge of Kaesong. It was 5:00 a.m. June 25, 1950.
As he headed south in a jeep to give the alarm, he could see
the railroad station a half a mile away where two or three
battalions of troops were off-loading. Previously, the track
had been taken up by North Koreans to seal off their border
with South Korea at the 38th parallel. Evidently it had been
re-laid during the night, and an all-out invasion had been
launched by the North.
Captain Darrigo, a member of the
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG, pronounced Kay-Mag)
assigned to the 1st Division of the Republic of Korea (ROK),
was the only American officer on the parallel that morning.
The attack was not expected because it was still the rainy
season.
Jack James, a prize winning
journalist with United Press in South Korea at the time,
says many expected an invasion but thought it would come
only after the rainy season. The North Korean build-up of
forces on the border had been reported, but U.S. officials
had questioned the report. There had been hundreds of border
clashes in the past and the ROKs had a tendency to enlarge
the number and severity of these instances to justify more
military aid.
The North Koreans fielded a highly
capable, Russian-trained, Russian-equipped army of 135,000
of whom almost one-third were veterans who had fought with
the Chinese Communists. These forces had defeated the
Nationalist Chinese, who fled to Formosa (Taiwan) in October
the previous year and made China a Communist country.
Fearing the South would attempt to
invade the North, the U.S. had only lightly armed the ROK
army of 65,000 and had supplied 500 American advisors (KMAG).
The ROKs also had 45,000 policemen, but they were neither
armed nor trained for combat.
The North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA)
was spearheaded by Russian-made T-34 tanks, believed by many
to be the best tank of World War II. Without adequate
anti-tank weapons, brave ROK soldiers attacked these steel
monsters with satchel charges. But after losing ninety men
without much results, this practice was stopped.
The ROK defenses crumbled under the
heavy weight of the NKPA attack. About one-third of the
South Korean soldiers were on leave. Refugees fled the panic
stricken capital of Seoul. Unfortunately, the bridge over
the Han River was blown prematurely, which prevented ROK
troops from withdrawing south with what little heavy
equipment they possessed. Many of their good officers and
NCOs were lost north of the Han. The NKPA occupied Seoul
June 28th. Political opponents by the thousands were rounded
up and executed. Later, when in North Korea, the ROKs wanted
to reply in kind, but close supervision by U.N. officials
kept these reprisals on a smaller scale.
Colonel Paik Sun Yup did manage to
get two of the three regiments of the 1st ROK Division south
of the river. Shocked and dismayed by this initially
overwhelming defeat, the staff officers repeatedly voiced
the question, “Will the Americans help us?” “Will the
Americans help us?” Some time later, American
fighter-bombers came in low and mistakenly strafed these ROK
troops. Although saddened by this loss to “friendly fire,”
Colonel Paik did turn to his staff and state, “See there,
the Americans will help us.”
Why had war erupted on the
Korean Peninsula? Why was the United States getting
involved?
UNITED NATIONS AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
Washington got word of the invasion
from Jack James’ UPI dispatch, which arrived before the
official cable to the State Department. President Harry
Truman and the United Nations, which had supervised the
elections in South Korea, were notified. Trygve Lie,
Secretary General of the U.N., declared, “This is war
against the United Nations.” President Truman ordered
Five-Star General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Commander in the
Far East, headquartered in Tokyo, to provide logistical
support for the ROKs while the U.N. called for withdrawal of
North Korean troops. When this appeal was ignored, the U.N.
called for its members to “. . . furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace and security to
the area.” Truman ordered U.S. naval and air forces to
assist the ROKs. After a personal reconnaissance revealed
the plight of the ROK troops, General MacArthur advised that
only U.S. ground troops could halt the invasion. These were
ordered to Korea on June 30th by the President, his most
difficult decision while in office.
Although excluded from the American
perimeter of defense, the National Security Council had
noted in 1948 that some moral obligation did exist since the
Republic of Korea was an American creation. One possible way
to save South Korea, should it be invaded, would be by a
United Nations “police action.”
The bulk of the U.N. forces to
serve in Korea would be American, whose peak strength
reached 348,000. Altogether 5.7 million were in uniform
during the period, while 1.5 million were rotated in and out
of Korea. Battle deaths for the three-year period numbered
33,627 as compared to 47,367 for the ten-year Vietnam War.
Combat deaths in Korea by service were: Army 27,704; Marines
4,267; Air Force 1,198; Navy 458.
Other countries to furnish combat
units, with their peak strength, were: Australia (2,282),
Belgium/Luxembourg (944), Canada (6,146), Colombia (1,068),
Ethiopia (1,271), France (1,119), Greece (1,263),
Netherlands (819), New Zealand (1,389), Philippines (1,496),
Republic of South Africa (826), Thailand (1,294), Turkey
(5,455), and the United Kingdom (Great Britain 14,198).
Medical units were furnished by Denmark, India, Italy,
Norway, and Sweden.
The Republic of Korea’s armed
forces reached a strength of 590,911 and suffered 272,975
casualties—killed, wounded, missing. Korean civilian deaths,
both North and South, have been estimated to have been over
2 million. Both the U.N. and ROK troops were placed under
command of General MacArthur. For the first time in history,
a world organization would use force to stop military
aggression.
During World War II, President
Franklin Roosevelt had asked the leader of the Soviet Union,
Joseph Stalin, to enter the war against Japan. Stalin said
he would two or three months after Germany’s surrender. He
could hardly refuse. The U.S. and Great Britain had shipped,
free of charge, huge quantities of war supplies, including
almost 500,000 American-made trucks and jeeps to the
Soviets, which enabled them to stave off a defeat by the
Germans during the early part of the war.
The Germans surrendered in May
1945. By August, the Soviets were trying to obtain more
concessions and incentives for entering the war against
Japan. The U.S. refused because Japan was on the verge of
collapse and Russian help was not needed. The first atomic
bomb was dropped on August 6 and the second bomb was dropped
on August 9, the same day the Soviets declared war on Japan.
The Japanese surrendered on August 14, 1945, five days
later.
The Soviet failure to conduct free
and open elections, in accordance with the Yalta agreements,
in Poland and other eastern European countries, which they
had overrun, had aroused U.S. suspicion and had sown the
seeds for the cold war. As their troops moved into Korea,
which the Japanese had annexed in 1910 and harshly occupied,
the U.S. contacted Moscow and asked them to accept surrender
of the enemy troops above the 38th parallel, while the U.S.
would do so south of that line. The Soviets agreed. Japan
traditionally had regarded the Korean Peninsula as a dagger
pointing at their country.
1945 TO 1950
Korea may well be called the
“Belgium of the East” because being located between the
great powers of China, Russia, and Japan, it has been caught
up in their conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War
1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905.
The Koreans are an ancient, hardy,
and talented people who developed movable metal type,
devised a 26-letter alphabet (although it failed to gain
wide usage), a submarine, an ironclad ship, and produced a
body of skilled workers. Their peninsula was a pathway for
cultural, educational, religious, scientific, and industrial
exchanges between Japan and continental Asia. Twice in the
late sixteenth century, Japan invaded Korea, causing
appalling levels of brutality, death, and destruction, and
took many of the Korean skilled artisans back to Japan.
Unfortunately for the Korean people, foreigners once again
would bring war, misery, and suffering to their country on
an unprecedented scale.
However, U.S. troops landing in the
south in 1945 brought much needed assistance in the form of
Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA).
Because of Soviet intransigence in eastern Europe, President
Truman set aside a previously agreed plan for a trusteeship,
which included the Soviets, to oversee Korea until self-rule
could be established.
Feeling fully capable of governing
themselves, most Koreans initially were against the
trusteeship. But when the Soviets called for the
trusteeship, those factions with communist sympathies sided
with the Soviet Union. No agreement could be reached on free
elections since the Russians wanted to deny the vote to
those who were against the trusteeship and those accused of
collaboration with the Japanese, while the U.S., of course,
felt everyone should have a vote.
The U.S. sought to dissolve the
barrier at the 38th parallel between North and South, but
the Soviets refused to do so until a united Korean
government had been established. Also, the industrial North
(population 9 million) added to the chaos in the
agricultural South (population 21 million) by greatly
curtailing the supply of coal, electricity, and other goods,
such as fertilizer, to the ROKs. Additional hardships had to
be borne because approximately two million people fled to
the South to escape the atrocities and plunder of Russian
troops, and to avoid persecution because of their opposition
to Soviet occupation policies. These refugees had to be fed
and housed in the South. A few thousand crossed over from
South to North.
The U.S. measured each action in
its sector so as not to offend the North; allowed political
dissent, which was mostly restricted in the North; and
refused to recognize any political faction until free
elections could be held, although these groups continued to
multiply causing political confusion and instability.
Syngman Rhee, an exile who had lived in the U.S., arrived
against State Department wishes.
Unable to reach an agreement with
the Soviets, the U.S. turned the problem over to the United
Nations in September 1947. Elections, under the auspices of
the U.N., were held in May 1948, but North Korea refused to
participate. A National Assembly of 198 members was elected.
One hundred seats were left vacant for North Korea to fill,
but without response.
Syngman Rhee was elected president,
while in the North a Soviet style election was held which
chose a Korean exile who had lived in the Soviet Union, Kim
Il Sung, as premier. Both leaders advocated unification, by
force if necessary. The North became a closed society. A
British minister, who was a well experienced Asian hand,
visited the South and declared the ROK government the most
encouraging he had seen. It did have flaws, however, but
democracy had no tradition in the Orient.
The Russians trained and equipped
an army in the North, withdrew, and challenged the U.S. to
do likewise. The South Koreans and the U.S. State Department
wanted the American troops to stay, but the GAROA funds
expired on June 20, 1949, and the U.S. Army had no funds to
keep the troops there. They were withdrawn. Most everyone
agrees that had the U.S. troops remained, there would have
been no war. U.S. troops remained in West Germany and
Communist East Germany did not invade. Clearly, the Korean
War could have been prevented by an adequate peacetime
defense budget.
Hearts were saddened in the North,
as well as in the South, over the division of their country.
Kim Il Sung pointed out how his Communist comrades had
fought with the Chinese to help defeat the hated Japanese.
They now would fight to unite Korea. The youth developed a
zeal for this reasonable, desirable goal and great crusade.
According to Nikita Khrushchev’s
memoirs, which were published in 1970, Kim went to Moscow
for Stalin’s approval. Russian staff officers planned the
details, but Stalin, fearing Americans would detect Soviet
involvement, withdrew most of the 7,000 Russian advisors in
Korea. Khrushchev believed that had they remained, the North
would have succeeded. Kim had promised that the war would
last only a short time because the South Koreans would rise
up against Rhee’s oppressive government and overthrow it.
This never occurred. For the most part, South Koreans
remained loyal to their government.
TASK FORCE SMITH
On July 4, 1950, two rifle
companies, B and C, one-half of Headquarters Company, one
section of 75mm recoilless rifles, and two 4.2 inch mortars,
under their battalion commander Lt. Colonel Charles “Brad”
Smith, were air-lifted from Japan to Pusan, Korea. They were
from the 2lst Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, on Japanese
occupation duty. A train took them north where they were
deployed near Osan, about 35 miles south of Seoul. They were
joined by a battery from the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion.
Riflemen had 120 rounds of ammunition and each man had two
days of “C” rations. They stood 508 men strong.
Their mission: make an arrogant
display of force and delay the main advance of the NKPA
until more U.S. troops arrive. Brad Smith was 34. Most of
his men were twenty years old or younger. About one in six
had combat experience. Many were draftees, while others had
volunteered for the draft in order to get their service
obligation behind them. Some had joined to “see the world.”
Fighting? Why should there be any fighting? We beat the
Germans and Japanese, didn’t we?
From a soft life in Japan, with
servants to wash their clothes and shine their boots, these
American youth were suddenly uprooted and flung into harm’s
way. There was no “Remember Pearl Harbor.” Why were they
there? Some bandits had crossed the border and would flee as
soon as they saw American uniforms, was the circulating
story.
The next morning at 7:00 a.m., NKPA
troops appeared in the distance. They were elements of two
regiments, about 5,000 men with thirty-three T-34 tanks.
Artillery and recoilless rifle fire had no effect on the
advancing tanks. The 105mm howitzer was not an anti-tank
weapon; however, a special HEAT (high explosive anti-tank)
round had been developed for emergency purposes. One field
piece had been deployed well forward for direct fire down
the road. The crew only had six HEAT rounds, which was 50%
of the allotment for the Far East. The rest had been shipped
to Europe, which had priority.
These teenagers were able to
destroy two tanks before running out of HEAT rounds. The
next tank knocked them out. As the remainder of enemy armor
ran through their position, Lt. Ollie Connor fired 22 rounds
from a 2.36 inch rocket launcher into the rear of the tanks
at very close range, with little appreciable effect. The
ammunition was old and many rounds failed to explode. The
weapon had been found to be ineffective against German armor
in 1943. The T-34s shot up the Americans’ vehicles parked in
the rear as they continued southward down the road.
The NKPA infantry with three tanks
now approached. Heavy fire from Task Force Smith halted
their frontal attack. While continuing a steady fire into
the defender’s position, the North Koreans began moving
large forces around each flank. As the ammunition supply
dwindled, LTC Smith gave the order to withdraw at 2:30 p.m.
It didn’t reach one platoon and the task force suffered most
of its casualties during this phase. Panic seized some as
they fled to the rear, weaponless but careful to skirt the
village where the enemy tanks were.
These American youngsters had held
up the enemy for almost a day and inflicted 130 casualties
while losing 185 of their own. Brad Smith reported that the
fighting qualities of the NKPA had been greatly
underestimated by U.S. intelligence.
The 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th
Division was the next unit to engage the invaders. The
equipment furnished the regiment was a national disgrace,
according to the operations officer (S-3), Major John J.
Dunn, who claimed that between 25% and 50% of the small arms
were unserviceable. Sergeant Roy F. Collins found in their
first combat that twelve of the thirty-one rifles in his
platoon were defective. Mortar ammunition was so old that,
in some cases, eight out of ten rounds failed to explode.
Few radios worked.
In order to get to Korea, the rest
of Task Force Smith’s regiment had to commandeer three rusty
Japanese freighters and a couple of war surplus LSTs
(Landing Ship Tank) before they could embark. One GI said,
“It was a hell of a way to go to war.”
AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY
Again and again, U.S. forces
committed piecemeal to battle were outnumbered, outgunned,
and outflanked by the highly motivated NKPA. The greatest
nation on the face of the earth had committed its youth to
battle, under-strength, under-trained, ill-equipped, and
ill-supplied. Experienced field grade officers lamented
that, “It was just criminal to commit our troops to battle,
manned and equipped the way they were.” In peacetime, Army
units stood at two-thirds strength, meaning that infantry
regiments had only two rifle battalions instead of the usual
three, around which battlefield tactics were formulated. In
practice, rifle companies were mostly 50% or more below
their authorized strength of 200 men.
At the end of World War II, the
United States had the greatest armed force the world had
ever seen. But now, five years later, she was hard pressed
to stop a fourth-rate power, North Korea. Why? Why?
Traditionally, America had never
been prepared for a war. It was a dispute over a peacetime
defense budget that initiated the events which led to the
Revolutionary War. The colonists wanted the protection of
the British troops during the French and Indian War. With
the Crown’s treasury depleted when the fighting ended, the
King’s minister asked the Americans to pay one-third of the
cost of the twenty battalions of redcoats stationed in the
colonies. They refused, fearful that large standing armies
could support oppressive governments or military strongmen
who would arise. Determined to collect some funds, the sugar
tax was rigorously enforced and when that didn’t work, there
was the Stamp act, and then the tax on tea, all of which
brought forth “taxation without representation” which, of
course, led to the revolution.
While teaching a class at the Army
War College, which involved a crisis in American history,
Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., was asked by an officer from a
third world country – many of whom were in attendance –
“What was the chance of a military coup?” The American
officers just laughed. The principle of civil control is so
ingrained in the military that never, never has such an act
been possible in this country, although it has happened
throughout the world.
Being true to form, post-war
defense budgets were small. Thinking to get more
bang-for-the-buck from the Air Force, who would drop A-bombs
on any enemy and win a quick victory, the Truman
administration gave that branch the largest portion. The
Navy was out some, but the biggest reduction was handed to
the Army. Everyone knew the next war would be fought with
push-buttons, rockets, missiles, etc….and there would be
little need for foot-slogging riflemen. This proved to be a
grave mistake, costing the country numerous unnecessary
casualties and some humiliating defeats.
In August 1949, the Soviet Union
exploded its first atomic bomb. The U.S. no longer had a
nuclear monopoly. By October of the same year, the Red
Chinese controlled the mainland, China became a Communist
country. Due to these changes in the international scene,
the National Security Council recommended to the President
(NSC-68) that U.S. ground forces would have to be built up
to an unprecedented peacetime level in order to counter the
threat of the huge conventional forces of the Soviet Union.
Although favorable to the idea, Truman knew that neither the
Congress nor the American people would approve of spending
the 50 billion dollars the plan called for, for peacetime
defense. The present budget was 13 billion. NSC-68 remained
on the shelf until the North Korean attack, at which time it
was approved.
WITHDRAWAL CONTINUES
The NKPA main thrust was along the
Seoul, Taejon, Taegu, Pusan axis. The U.S. 25th Infantry
Division (Tropical Lightning) began arriving July 10. It was
positioned to back ROK troops in the central sector and
prevent an enemy drive on Taegu. But the ROK troops were
able to hold in this better defensive, mountainous area
where few T-34 tanks were employed. So well, in fact, that
the NKPA corps commander was relieved because of his slow
progress.
On July 19, the town of Yechon, an
important road junction, fell but was retaken by the all
black 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division. War
correspondent Tom Lambert reported it as the “…first
sizeable American ground victory of the Korean War.” Captain
Charles Bussey, a black fighter pilot during World War II,
won a Silver Star as a combat engineer. Back in the U.S.,
blacks began appearing at the recruiting offices, asking to
get in that 24th Regiment.
On the morning of July 18, General
Walton Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, which
included all American and ROK forces in Korea, arrived at
Taejon and asked General William Dean, the 24th Division
Commanding Officer (CO), if he could hold the city until the
20th when units just landing from the U.S. 1st Cavalry
Division would be in position to reinforce him. (It was
“cavalry” in name only.) Although he had intended to
evacuate Taejon, Dean told Walker he could hold. It was the
biggest mistake of his life. Attacked, outflanked, and
overrun by the NKPA 3rd and 4th Divisions, the city fell.
Dean was captured and spent three years in POW camps.
American GIs fought bravely at
times. At other times when confronted with overwhelming,
numerically superior forces, they “bugged-out” to the rear,
cursing their government for sending them to this stinking,
God-forsaken place where human feces were used to fertilize
the land.
The battered U.S. 24th Division,
which was relieved by the 1st Cavalry on July 22, stood at
about one-half its strength 17 days earlier. It had lost
enough equipment to field a full division, including
thirty-one 105mm and five 155mm howitzers. There was a
terrible toll on senior officers. Besides General Dean,
three regimental COs were lost, one killed, one wounded, and
one relieved. One regimental executive officer was wounded
while two staff officers were captured. Five rifle battalion
commanders were lost, including two killed, one captured,
and two medically evacuated. Numerous other field-grade
officers were killed, captured, wounded, or sacked,
including two from the field artillery battalions (FAB).
PFC Sheffield Clark, whose 63rd FAB
entered combat on July 6, remembers it this way: “It was the
frantic hit-and-run tactics—and the running war south. We
were short on ammo and supplies. Tiger tanks (Russian T-34s)
were our nightmare and we had no ammo for our rocket
launchers (anti-tank weapons). At one time, our field
artillery unit was 2,000 yards ahead of the 3rth Infantry we
were supposed to be supporting. Infiltrators were picking us
off—dressed up like old Korean women—with pistols held at
real old Korean women to get past our outposts, posed as
refugees moving south away from the fighting. Our position
was overrun by infiltrators who came in behind us. The
attack was so swift that our machine gunners were killed and
our own machine guns were turned against us. They captured
our 105s, then captured a trainload of ammo for them. There
were only twelve of us left out of my battery by the time we
got back to Taejon.”
The need for replacement in these
front-line units was acute. Supply and service personnel in
Japan were reclassified as infantry and sent to Korea.
Reservists were quickly called to active duty. Master
Sergeant Ralph Yelton, who saw combat in Europe during World
War II, was re-called, given five days’ orientation, and
sent to Korea where he participated in the heavy fighting
during the first year. He was wounded for a second time and
paralyzed from the waist down.
Bewildered Korean youth were taken
off the streets, given ten days training, and assigned to
U.S. units. Thrown in with strangers with a strange language
and strange customs, some performed remarkably well. But
most were, not surprisingly, unable to do what was expected
of them, so the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation To The U.S.
Army) was gradually phased out.
This extreme shortage of front line
replacements was the “necessity” that became the “mother” of
full integration in the Army. Although President Truman
ordered such in 1948, in practice black soldiers were still
assigned to all black units, such as the 24th Infantry
Regiment. The 9th Infantry CO, Chin Sloane, would accept
black fillers. Butch Barberis, one of his battalion
commanders, remembers it this way: “I was very, very low on
men—less than half strength—and raised hell to get more
troops. The division G-1 (personnel officer) called and,
knowing that I had previously commanded a battalion of black
troops, said he had almost 200 from labor units in Pusan
that had served in my battalion who would transfer to
infantry if they could serve with me. I agreed. In fact, I
was proud to have them. They were good fighting men.”
From this beginning in Korea, the
Armed Services have become an outstanding equal opportunity
employer. While blacks make up only 13% of the population,
the services are well over 30% black. African-American
General Colin Powell became a highly regarded and effective
recent Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Jim Harris, a member of the 70th
Tank Battalion serving as school troops at Fort Know, was
scheduled to get out of the service soon. When war broke
out, the 70th was given 96 hours to pack up for the move to
Korea. A special appeal was made to the 13 men who did not
have enough time left on their enlistment to be sent
overseas: “American GIs were being shot to hell by
Russian-made tanks. They need your help.” All 13 re-enlisted
except one, who later showed up in Korea with the 2nd
Division.
The battalion was so short of tanks
that those on concrete pedestals as monuments around Fort
Knox had to be taken down and made operational by installing
engines, transmissions, and other equipment. Such parts had
to be flown in from various areas of the country. The men
worked straight through with almost no sleep, but the
deadline was met.
When these M-4 and M-26 medium
tanks, which were equal to the enemy T-34s, roared up to the
front lines on August 14, the haggard, combat-worn, and
weary front-line troops, some openly sobbing, ran forward to
meet them. They crowded around the ugly steel monsters and
patted them as if they had been bloodied horses. It was then
that Jim Harris knew that he had done the right thing to
come to the aid of his countrymen. The emotion is still
there as he tells the story today.
Rusting hulks were collected from
old Pacific World War II battlefields, refurbished in Japan
and used to equip another, much needed tank battalion, the
70th. Its commander, a 34-year-old Tom Dolvin (West Point
’39), received verbal orders on a golf course in the United
States on July 12 and was in combat in Korea on August 2.
Whew!
The 1st Cavalry Division, which
relieved the luckless 24th Division, had only 11,000 of its
authorized wartime strength of 18,900 men. Around 750 of its
noncommissioned officers had been transferred to the 24th
when it first went into action. The Cav made a strong stand
on the Taejon/Taegu road and delayed the advance of the NKPA.
During the heavy fighting, one battalion (the 2nd of the 8th
regiment) was encircled and cut off. Artillery men found
themselves fighting as infantry. They lowered their tubes
for direct fire into the oncoming enemy. Repeated attempts
to break through to the surrounded men failed, but cost 275
casualties. Finally, on the night of July 24/25, the
battalion split up, leaving their vehicles and heavy
equipment, and infiltrated back to friendly lines.
The 27th Regiment (Wolfhounds) of
the 25th Division was the first American regiment to
completely defeat a full-scale NKPA attack. One of its two
battalions was on line, with the other well to the rear in
reserve. The initial assault was repulsed after heavy, close
combat; however, six tanks penetrated to the battalion
command post (CP). Three were destroyed by ground fire,
while the other three were knocked out by Air Force F-80
jets.
Believing the enemy would remount
the attack that night, Colonel Michaelis had the front-line
unit pull back, quietly, along side the reserve battalion
just after dark. The attack was renewed at dawn. The NKPA,
seeking to double envelope the abandoned position, moved
troops around both flanks which naturally passed in front of
the two Wolfhound battalions. Their heavy fire was so
devastating that it was quite awhile before the enemy could
mount an offensive in that sector. Michaelis said, “The kids
won a battle—won it big—and that was very important for the
outfit. They developed that all-important confidence right
away. In fact, they became so cocky they were almost
intolerable.” General Walker would use the Wolfhounds in the
coming weeks as his fire brigade, sent to trouble spots
around the perimeter.
THE PUSAN PERIMETER
As the Eighth Army continued to
reel under the withering blows of the NKPA, General Walker
received a visit from General MacArthur, who promised, “Help
is on the way.” Walker would be reinforced by the 2nd
Infantry Division, the 5th Marines and the Army’s 5th
Regimental Combat Team (RCT). There were to be no more
withdrawals. Walker had to hold for six weeks while a
reserve force of two divisions was built up and landed
behind enemy lines at the port of Inchon on the Yellow Sea.
This would cut off supplies to the NKPA in the south and
assure their defeat. Without question, the Eighth Army must
hold. Walker issued to his troop commanders what the press
dubbed as his “stand or die” order. There would be no more
retreating. “We are going to hold this line. We are going to
win.”
The U.N. forces dug in along their
meager toehold in southeastern Korea, which became known as
the Pusan Perimeter. The western edge, manned by U.S.
troops, ran from the Korea Strait north along the Naktong
River for about 85 miles. Just north of Taegu, the line
turned east and ran for about 50 miles to Pohang on the Sea
of Japan. ROK troops defended in this mountainous sector.
They had performed better than expected and inflicted severe
casualties on the attackers. They had naval gunfire support
from U.S. and British ships. Once retreating down the coast,
the 3rd ROK Division was surrounded. The Navy took them off
and landed them farther south.
Kim Il Sung ordered his North
Korean troops to take Pusan by August 15 (Korean time),
regardless of casualties. It was the anniversary of the
Japanese surrender. Astrological reckoning, timing, and
dates are important in the Orient. The fighting was furious.
The NKPA suffered the casualties, but they did not take
Pusan. It was a moment to be proud of American arms.
Undaunted by these losses, the
North Koreans poured more troops into the area to continue
the struggle. Time was against them. They must prevail now
before the U.N. forces were built up to a level which would
preclude a NKPA victory. Astonishingly, they were able to
maintain a high morale and keep their troops supplied, in
spite of the U.N. control of the air, by moving men and
material at night. ROK Colonel Min Ki Sik had formed a
scratch force of regimental size (Task Force Min), delayed
their advance through the southwest, and added to their
ration problem by confiscating much of the rice in the area
and shipping it to Pusan. The NKPA was expected to live off
the land.
The Pusan Perimeter was not a
series of two-man foxholes every few yards—there were too
few troops for this—but rather an offensive-defense.
Observation posts were strung along the front and when the
enemy movement was detected, troops located in strong points
well to the rear would come forward to attack and push the
NKPA back across the Naktong River. They were greatly aided
by the Air Force and Navy performing observation and close
ground support. Forty-four percent of these tactical
missions were flown by the Navy and Marines from carrier
decks stationed off shore. The Air Force operated at
considerable disadvantage at this time, however, for there
were only two strips in Korea suitable for use by F-51 and
C-47 type of aircraft—K-2 at Taegu and K-3 at Yonil on the
east coast. Both were dirt strips. Most of the tactical
planes flew from Japan.
The fighting was fierce. U.N.
forces were holding on by the skin of their teeth. New units
arriving at Pusan were quickly thrown into the battle. Two
battalions of the 29th Infantry from Okinawa were committed
before they had cleaned all the cosmoline (packing grease)
from their newly issued weapons.
The Wolfhounds, in Army reserve,
were shifted here and there to the hot spots. Twice the
First Marine Provisional Brigade was called to eject an
enemy penetration at the Naktong Bulge. The Army troops of
the 24th and 2nd Infantry Divisions had fought their hearts
out for eleven days in this area and stopped the enemy
advance, but were too weak to push the North Koreans back
across the river.
Lt. William R. Ellis, who
experienced combat in World War II, says the 9th Infantry
Regiment fought magnificently. “The original group of
officers was gallant and far under-ranked. Most of the
company commanders were (only) first lieutenants, which was
a disgrace itself. They were forty-year-old, gray-haired
World War II veterans (reserves called up) and still
lieutenants in combat in 1950. I knew them all and have
regretted at times that I did not join them (in death) for
they by-and-large died unknown and unrewarded for their
bravery.” E Company had all its officers wiped out on five
occasions.
Enlisted man, Charles Payne of the
34th Infantry Regiment, remembers it this way: “Masses of
gooks (enemies) poured over the hills and through the gaps
like a flood. Our people were fighting like seasoned
troopers, but were just being overpowered….Hour after hour
we held the North Koreans off … time and time again gooks
rushed us. Each time we would lose a man, they would lose
many. The ground was covered with their dead. We stacked our
dead around us for protection. The battle seemed to go on
forever.”
Few Americans today, or even then,
know of the desperate struggle, the pain and suffering, the
utmost heroic effort and valor displayed to stop the North
Korean assaults. The U.S. suffered its highest casualties of
the entire war during these six weeks. If and when the
public does become conscious of this all-important battle,
it will, no doubt, be ranked alongside Bunker Hill, the
Alamo, Bataan, and Corregidor.
THE INCHON LANDING
This clever and risky operation of
landing at Inchon far behind enemy lines was conceived by
General MacArthur on his personal reconnaissance to Korea
June 29, but it had to be postponed to commit the troops he
planned to use in order to delay the NKPA steamroller
pushing down the peninsula.
The Navy and Marines, the country’s
amphibious experts, as well as most Army people not on
MacArthur’s staff, were against the operation. One admiral
said, “We drew up a list of every natural and geographical
handicap to a landing and Inchon had them all.” The narrow
channel to the landing site could easily be blocked,
currents were as high as 8 knots, there were no beaches,
only the easily defended city of Inchon … and many more. The
worst of all were the 32 feet high tides which left nothing
but mud flats at low tide, forcing a 12-hour wait for a
second landing.
At a Tokyo meeting on August 23,
the Navy spent 85 minutes in a gloomy presentation of the
obstacles, but concluded that while it would be a most
difficult operation, it was not impossible. Present were
chiefs of Navy, Army, Fifth Air Force, General MacArthur,
and some of his staff. MacArthur then made a masterful
presentation of the complex military operation.
“Spellbinding” was how Navy Chief Admiral Forrest Sherman
and Army Chief General J. Lawton Collins described it.
Admiral James Doyle said that if MacArthur had gone on
stage, the world would have never heard of John Barrymore
(famous American actor of the 1920s and 1930s).
The Inchon Landing became one of
the most brilliant moves in American military history. The
slaughter of slugging it out head-to-head and toe-to-toe
around the Pusan Perimeter would cease; thousands of
casualties would be prevented and a decisive victory would
be won. No other nation in the world had the means and the
knowledge to put together, on such short notice, over 200
ships to land 70,000 troops successfully in such a
precarious place. “The Navy has never shone more brightly”
were the words of the Far East Commander.
The First Marine Division landed a
battalion (2 BN, 5th Regiment) on Wolmi-do (the fortified
island guarding the entrance to Inchon) at 6:33 a.m. on
September 15, 1950. An hour later, the island was secure.
Because of the high tides, the next 12 hours would be
sweated out before the other landings at Inchon proper could
take place. When they did, the 1st Marine Regiment and the
remainder of the 5th reached their objectives with light
opposition from the surprised enemy; Marine and Naval air
ruled the skies. ROK Marines occupied Inchon while the U.S.
Marines, with their 7th Regiment, moved out toward Seoul
twenty miles away. The 7th U.S. Infantry Division landed and
moved south of the city to protect the Marine flank, cut off
NKPA personnel fleeing from the south, and link up with
forces breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter.
The landing troops were designated
X Corps and under the command of Major General Ned Almond, a
brusque, overbearing officer who had offended the 1st Marine
Division Commander, Oliver Smith. Smith was suspicious and
resentful of being under Army command. As the Marines
attacked the heavily fortified area west of Seoul, General
Almond suggested to Smith that he send one regiment to the
south and cross the Han river right into the capital city.
General Smith refused, saying that he wanted to keep his
regiments together. As Marine casualties continued to mount,
Almond sent the Army’s 32nd Regiment across without losing a
man or piece of equipment. They were followed by the 17th
ROK regiment. After a strong attack on the Army unit the
major NKPA force withdrew, but their rear guard continued to
offer stiff resistance to the Marines fighting into the
heart of the city.
NORTH KOREAN INCURSION
The Inchon Landing had changed the
fortunes of war almost overnight, insuring a NKPA defeat.
General Matthew Ridgway said if it had been suggested that
MacArthur could walk on water, most would have believed it.
But now the Far East Commander made a serious mistake.
On September 27, he was ordered by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cross the 38th parallel without
fanfare and with little publicity. The objective was to
destroy the remaining NKPA forces and unite the North under
the government of South Korea. With some reluctance, the
U.N. approved this action. Some of the reasons given
(NSC-81) were (1) 2,500 American and 25,000 ROK POWs were
being held; (2) Red China, which had massive economic and
social problems and with an Army lacking armor, heavy
artillery, and air support, would probably not intervene;
(3) taking North Korea away from Russian influence would
increase U.S. chances of rapprochement with China; (4) if
left intact, North Korea might invade again after it
recovered; (5) Syngman Rhee was intent on unifying the
country and would be difficult to hold in check; (6)
Americans were outraged at the atrocities committed by the
enemy against U.S. forces; and (7) with the total victory of
World War II so recent, it would be hard for the Truman
administration, accused of being soft on Communism, to
settle for anything less. MacArthur was to engage any
Chinese forces encountered in Korea “…as long as, in your
judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a
reasonable chance of success.”
Fearing stubborn resistance at the
North Korean capital of Pyongyang, MacArthur withdrew the X
Corps and landed it on the east coast so that it would
attack across the “narrow waist” of Korea toward Pyongyang
from the east while the Eighth Army attacked from the south.
This was a tragic mistake not only because of the delay it
caused, which allowed some recovery against NKPA units and
time for Chinese to deploy, unseen in Korea, but overloaded
the transportation system—heavily damaged by U.N. bombing—to
the extent that it was very difficult to keep the Eighth
Army supplied for its incursion into North Korea. It
happened that resistance was light and Pyongyang was taken
by the 1st Cav and 1st ROK Division on October 19. The ROK
troops advanced so rapidly up the east coast that they took
the landing site of Wonsan before the X Corps arrived by
sea.
A perfectly executed air drop by
the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team north of Pyongyang
was too late to rescue a trainload of U.S. POWs, who were
massacred before the paratroopers landed. A NKPA force of
500 was caught between the 187 and the Australian Battalion,
27th British Commonwealth Brigade advancing to link up with
the troopers. Fearing their fire would hit the Americans,
they fixed bayonets, charged the enemy, killed 270, and
captured 200, while miraculously sustaining only seven
wounded of their own.
CHINESE INTERVENTION
By the 1860s, expansionist Russia,
under the Czars, reached the Pacific at Vladivostok.
Defeated in a conflict with Japan (1904-1905), Russia
regarded that country as her natural enemy in the area.
During the 1930s and during World War II, Joseph Stalin had
supported the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek
because, from a practical standpoint, they were the only
force capable of opposing the Japanese at that time.
Popular with the Chinese Communists
was Mao Zedong, who, although not trained in Moscow as were
other Chinese, would become the leader of the party in
China. He was in a constant struggle to maintain his
leadership within the party and to avoid destruction from
his sworn enemy Chiang Kai-shek. Relations between Mao and
Stalin were cool. When the Nationalists were defeated
(October 1949) and the People’s Republic of China was
established by the Communists, U.S. far eastern policy
changed. Support for Chiang had ceased sometime before
because his corrupt regime did not have popular support.
In December of 1949, U.s. embassies
were advised that should Formosa (Taiwan)—where the
Nationalists had fled—fall to the Communists, it would not
be considered a threat to U.S. security. A rapprochement
would be made to the People’s Republic, showing that Russia,
coveting Manchuria as she did, was China’s real enemy.
It appears that Stalin became aware
of this change. McLean, Burgess, and Philby, working in
British intelligence with access to U.S. information, were
later discovered to be Soviet spies. (During the war
MacArthur would sense that someone was reading his
messages.) Continued success by Mao would make him a rival
for the leadership of international Communism. As Stalin had
promised to help the North Koreans, he had also offered aid
to the Chinese who had massed 200,000 troops opposite
Formosa for the invasion. Did Stalin coerce Kim Il Sung to
invade first so that he would have an excuse to delay help
to the Chinese? Was his support of the Korean invasion an
effort to impede U.S./China rapprochement?
When the Inchon Landing changed the
whole course of the war in Korea, Stalin urged the Chinese
to intervene, promising them air power. At an October 1st
meeting, most Chinese leaders were against intervention,
although 80% of Chinese heavy industry was in Manchuria and
most dependent on electric power generated in North Korea.
General Peng The-huai, who would command Chinese Communist
Forces (CCF) in Korea, said that if the Americans reached
the Yalu River (border between Korea and Manchuria), they
would find an excuse to invade China. Mao felt that China
should come to the aid of its neighbor. A decision was made
to intervene, which appeared to be based on their own
national interest and not Russian pressure.
Moving at night and using excellent
camouflage, troops of the CCF Fourth Field Army (200,000)
already in Manchuria crossed into Korea while troops of the
Third Field Army (120,000) headed north to reinforce them.
These forces were undetected by U.N. aerial reconnaissance
which was mostly employed in a strategic role: location of
targets and evaluation of bombing. Chairman Mao instructed
his commanders in the field to first destroy two or three
divisions of the “puppet, running-dog Sungman Rhee.”[sic]
And, if the U.S. Forces did not advance beyond the
Pyongyang-Wonsan line, the CCF were to wait six months while
being supplied with Russian artillery and air power and then
expel all enemy forces from Korea.
U.N. forces continued their advance
and, on October 25 at Unsan (oon-san), about 70 miles north
of Pyongyang, the ROK 15th Regiment was stopped by Chinese,
who had been deployed in the mountains since October 17. The
U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment sent to their aid was badly
mauled, losing a whole battalion. A regiment from the 6th
ROK Division made it to the Yalu, but was destroyed. Two
other ROK regiments coming to its assistance were routed.
Then the Chinese mysteriously withdrew. The same thing
happened in the eastern sector where the Marines were
stopped in their advance to the Chosin Reservoir, and then
the enemy withdraw. Prisoners sent back to headquarters were
confirmed to be Chinese. Intelligence estimated that there
were no more than 27,000 (later upgraded to 70,000) Chinese
in Korea. There were 320,000!
The advance of the Eighth Army
(118,000) resumed on November 24, despite a shortage of
supplies, including winter clothing. Some riflemen had as
few as 16 rounds of ammunition. On the night of the 25th,
the CCF struck the II ROK Corps on the Army’s right flank
with a massive attack which disorganized the South Koreans
and sent them reeling to the rear. To their left, the U.S.
2nd and 25th Divisions were also hit with furious assaults
and penetrated in some spots, but were able to restore the
situation and hold. The collapse of the ROKs exposed the
flank of the 2nd Division and forced the U.N. forces to
withdraw. Two regiments of the 2nd were almost destroyed at
Kunu-ri, but the rest of the Army withdrew in good order,
using their mobility to outdistance the slower moving CCF,
who could maintain an offensive for only a few days.
In the X Corps sector in the east,
one regiment of the 7th Division reached the Yalu at
Hyesanjin, but the Marines were stopped at the Chosin
Reservoir. Oliver Smith, sensing more enemy in the area than
being reported, moved more slowly than Ned Almond was urging
him. He stockpiled ammunition and supplies along the way.
His caution contributed greatly to saving his command. An
Army task force of two mismatched battalions, artillery, and
other supporting units were hurried into position to protect
the Marine right flank.
The bulk of the 120,000 CCF in the
area hit the Marines and the army Task Force. Winter had set
in with temperatures of 24 degrees below zero. Flesh stuck
to metal. Weapons and vehicles froze. In their fighting
withdrawal, the Marines inflicted horrendous casualties on
the enemy while sustaining 4,418 battle casualties and 7,313
non-battle casualties (mostly weather-related). For the
first time in history, flying boxcars (C-119-type aircraft)
dropped a treadway bridge which enabled them to get their
heavy equipment out over Funchilin Pass, where a bridge had
been destroyed. Paratrooper Fred Fishel said a practice drop
in Japan had failed. By December 11, the last man reached
the safety of the lodgment area of Hungnam, held by the U.S.
3rd Division. Plagued by the Katusa factor, low ammunition,
and the loss of all four senior commanders, the ill-fated
Army unit (Task Force MacLean/Faith) held out for five
nights and four days to its own destruction. Of its original
strength of 2,500, only 385 were fit for duty, but they did
protect the Marine right flank and rendered
combat-ineffective the CCF 80th Division.
The CCF forced the U.N. out of
North Korea, but at a tremendous cost. Sources favorable to
the Communist side estimate that the U.N. inflicted
casualties on their adversary at the rate of 20 to 1. It was
reported that General Peng flew to Mao’s headquarters,
dragging him out of bed to complain that the troops were
exhausted and their clothing, equipment, and support was
totally unsuited for such a campaign.
The X Corps was evacuated by sea
with almost 100,000 civilians unwilling to live under
Communism coming out with them. Because of its shattered
right flank the Eighth Army retired to a more narrow portion
of the peninsula about 45 miles south of the 38th parallel
where they were joined by the X Corps.
The U.N. asked for an armistice at
the parallel, but the elated Chinese, who had gained world
acclaim, refused to consider seriously the proposal. Pouring
in more troops, their goal was the explusion of U.N. forces
in South Korea. General Walker was killed in a jeep accident
on December 24. General Matthew Ridgway was given command of
the Eighth Army, which was plagued with defeat,
disappointment, and low morale. Ridgway, who believed the
plight of the withdrawal had been greatly exaggerated in the
press, soon had his troops turned around and began pushing
the CCF and NKPA back into North Korea. Five-star General
Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
that his brilliant, driving, uncompromising leadership
turned the tide of battle as no other general in American
military history.
AMERICAN POLICY
One false concept which hampered
American policy throughout the cold war that all Communists
were directly controlled and every action dictated from
Moscow. Although U.S. Russian experts, such as George Kennan,
Chip Bolen, and Averell Harriman, believed that the Soviet
Union was not ready for war, did not want war, Americans
were ready to accept that the North Korean invasion might
well be the beginning of World War III. Therefore, the U.S.
7th Fleet was sent to the Formosa Strait to prevent an
invasion from the mainland of Nationalist china. This, of
course, sent an entirely hostile signal to the People’s
Republic to whom, in December 1949, the U.S. was seeking
rapprochement.
During World War II, victory in
Europe was the first goal, while the Pacific was of
secondary priority. After the turnaround in Inchon, the
Joint Chiefs asked MacArthur how soon he could release a
division or two for Europe. Here’s where the real concern
was. The Chinese intervention heightened U.S. fears of World
War III. It was in reference to widening the war to mainland
China that General Bradley said we would be fighting the
wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time. During the
fighting in Korea, six U.S. divisions were sent to Europe,
while the most U.S. divisions on line at any one time in
Korea was seven. That’s right, seven!
Fearing for Europe, President
Truman wanted to cool down the war in Korea. The legendary
hero of World War II in the Pacific, Douglas MacArthur
wanted to expand the war, believing a victory in Asia would
secure peace in Europe. Although warned, he continued to
publicly express these views, so he was relieved of command
in April 1951. A big uproar ensued, but soon died down in
the public mind, as the war was to do also.
Seoul had been retaken in March as
U.N. forces continued to push northward. A CCF
counteroffensive failed in April to recapture the capital
and, in May in east central Korea, their attack became known
as the May Massacre because of their heavy losses. When the
war broke out the year before and action was taken by the
U.N. to support South Korea, the Soviets were boycotting the
meetings because Red China had not been admitted. In June
1951, Soviet delegate to the U.N., Jacob Malik, who had
returned, proposed truce talks. [The Russian archives
indicate that the North Koreans and Chinese persuaded Stalin
to ask for peace talks. Pulitzer Prize Winner John Toland,
the only American to examine the Chinese archives, maintains
that both countries were not only surprised but somewhat
dissatisfied with Stalin’s action.] The Chinese had suffered
an unbelievable number of casualties, had shot their bolt,
and were ready to talk peace. The Soviets had lost face in
the Communist world. The U.S. had sent troops to aid its
ally, South Korea, and Russia had not. Chinese influence in
North Korea increased as Russia’s decreased. Mao gained
stature as a world leader. Both Great Britain and the U.S.
embarked on huge rearmament programs. NATO became a reality
under the command of an American general. West Germany moved
toward being a sovereign state, with its own military force.
American defense spending in Japan—Toyota was almost
bankrupt—propelled her toward being an economic super power.
The Soviets had come up short everywhere. Their only
success: U.S./China rapprochement was delayed until
President Nixon’s time, 20 years later.
TRUCE TENT AND THE FIGHTING FRONT
The talks began on July 10, 1951.
Expecting the cease fire line to be exactly on the parallel,
the communists balked when the U.N. refused to move back
from their good defensive positions just north of the line
to where none existed at the parallel. The CCF/NKPA
delegates walked out. The U.N. renewed their offensive
action, which had been curtailed to show sincerity during
the peace talks. In hard, hard fighting, the U.S. 2nd
Division, the French Battalion, and some ROK troops forced
the NKPA from Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge. The North
Koreans claimed it was their most difficult battle of the
whole war.
The pressure brought the Communists
back to the peace table on November 27, 1951, and slow, slow
progress was made, although they were most difficult in
negotiations. The last item to be settled was the exchange
of prisoners. A huge number of U.N.-held prisoners did not
wish to be returned to the Communist side, while the
Communists naturally argued that all should be returned.
Disagreement on this point prolonged the fighting for 15
months and all the world could see that “… liberty and
justice for all”… was not merely an empty phrase with the
United States of America.
During the lull in U.N. offensive
action, the NKPA/CCF improved their position to an extent
not possible for their less mobile forces during normal
activity. They brought up artillery until they had more guns
on line than the U.N. They prepared well dug-in positions in
depth, some as far back as 20 miles.
Static warfare developed. After
November 1951, the U.N. forces staged no all-out offensives
since the U.N. believed that peace was near at hand and
ground gained would have to be relinquished. But, small
actions were initiated by both sides to improve the
positions they held. There were battles in the Punch Bowl
and Iron Triangle areas, and names such as “Old Baldy,”
“White Horse,” “Jackson Heights,” “T-Bone,” and “Pork Chop”
became personal experiences where men were maimed, bled, and
died while they struggled to be “king of the mountain,” this
mountain or that mountain. They fought the blistering heat,
the stench, the rats and bugs, the rain, the extreme cold,
the snow and ice, and life in the bunkers. They performed
everlasting patrol duty to keep contact with the enemy. The
45th and 40th Divisions replaced the 1st CAV and 24th
Divisions, which went back to Japan.
Highly valued by the ground troops
was the close support U.N. fighter-bombers provided.
Initially, the Air Force encountered difficulty in
establishing a uniform system of close support for ground
troops—the most complex of its tactical missions—from the
three different systems used in World War II; one from
Europe, one from Central Pacific, and one from Southwest
Pacific. Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) were assigned
to each infantry regiment which was expected to use its own
artillery for any targets within 1,000 yards of its front
line. The Marines provided controllers for each rifle
battalion (three battalions per regiment at full strength)
which expected to use air support as its artillery, based on
the invasion of small islands during WWII where sufficient
artillery was often not available. Controversy over the
systems continued throughout the war.
The heavy bombing of North Korea
certainly hampered their war effort, but proved to be not as
decisive as its advocates claimed. Early in the war, the
U.N. Air Forces easily defeated the small North Korean
Force. B-29 Superforts ranged over the North but by November
1950 were forced into mostly night operations as China
entered the war. Russian pilots, disguised as Chinese, flew
their MiG-15 fighters from air fields in Manchuria (off
limits to U.N. planes) to attack bombers over the north. In
the first aerial combat between jet aircraft, the MiGs
outclassed the U.N. F-80s and F-84s. However, the
superiority of U.N. pilots maintained air supremacy until
the arrival of the F-86 Saberjet, a match for the Russian
plane. A 10-to-1 kill ratio was achieved over the MiGs.
Communist air was never used to support their effort on the
ground.
The new Mobile Army Surgical
Hospitals (M*A*S*H), stationed up close to the fighting
front, reduced the deaths due to battle wounds by 50% of
World War II figures. Helicopters were first used to
evacuate wounded, supply and transport troops.
Most of the American POWs were
captured during the first six months of the war. About 50%
died due to wounds, disease, exposure, and malnutrition.
Those that did survive in harsh, primitive, subhuman
conditions were subjected to “brainwashing,” a program to
destroy faith in their country and convert them to
Communism. Much publicity was given to the “turncoats,” the
22 (one British) who stayed behind, while 3,766 Americans
and 977 British returned to their homeland. The
“brainwashing” could hardly be termed successful.
Embarrassed that so many of their
POWs were refusing repatriation, the Communists instigated
their hard-liners in U.N. custody to riot. They captured a
camp commandant and although he was later released, it was a
very humiliating incident. About 22,000 Communist-POWs
screened by troops from neutral India refused to return.
Another 25,000 were released against U.N. wishes by
President Syngman Rhee to fade into the countryside.
In May and June of 1953, the NKPA/CCF
launched some of the largest attacks of the war, mostly
against ROK troops, in an effort to influence the peace
talks. Rhee was refusing to sign an armistice that left his
country divided. Now with experienced leadership, better
equipment, and better trained personnel, the South Korean
units were no longer the undependable force they had been at
the beginning, but were able to hold and inflict heavy
losses on the enemy. These greatly improved troops occupied
two-thirds of the U.N. line. Rhee agreed not to invade the
north, but never did sign the cease-fire agreement which the
other belligerents did on July 27, 1953. Elected in 1952,
President Eisenhower had let it be known in May ’53 that if
a negotiated settlement could not be reached, he was
prepared to seek a military solution, implying the use of
atomic bombs and earlier measures advocated by MacArthur.
The Korean War was one of the most
important events of the 20th Century because for the first
time, force was used to contain communism. So stated PBS
News Hour historians. Had North Korea succeeded in adding
territory to the communist bloc of nations through a force
of arms, they would have tried again and again. A degree of
stability came upon the world scene because COMMUNISTIC
MILITARY AGGRESSION WAS DEFEATED IN KOREA.
A worldwide alarm had been sounded
to aggressors that force would be met with counter force. A
degree of stability came on the world scene which cannot be
calculated. The U.S. had completely shed its traditionally
isolationist shell and fully accepted the role of leadership
of the free world thrust upon it by the results of World War
II. Before Korea, America had only one commitment outside of
the western hemisphere—NATO. By the mid-1950s, there were
450 military bases in 36 countries with links to 20
countries outside of Latin America, including Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
North Korea remains a closed,
totalitarian state, widely regarded as a threat to world
peace. South Korea is an economic miracle, America’s seventh
largest trading partner and staunchest ally. By 1995, she
had become the world’s eleventh strongest economy and the
fifth largest producer of automobiles. For once, in their
long history, able to act solely in their own national
interest, they have produced an astounding level of
prosperity, with the freedom to enjoy it.
“It was a war in
which we turned the tide against Communism for the first
time. Our defense of freedom laid the foundation for the
march of democracy we’re seeing today around the world.” -
President George W. Bush, May 1, 1990
The U.S. Army, with a strength of
591,000 in 1950, had to be tripled in order to meet
international commitments and fight a war on a 150-mile wide
peninsula. Today, with almost twice the population of then,
plans are to reduce Army strength to below the 1950 level.
END - BRIEF HISTORY
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